

Original Research Article

Kant's Aesthetic Critique in Experimental Aesthetics: A critical Analysis

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Abstract

Problem statement: One of the most influential and, of course, controversial theories of Kant in aesthetics, expressed in his critique of judgment, is that he considers aesthetic judgment to be both subjective and universally valid. At the same time, Kant emphasizes that there is a fundamental difference between the beautiful and the agreeable. The question is how it can be subjective and also universally valid? And whether the difference between the beautiful and agreeable can be proved empirically?

Research objective: The purpose of this study is specifically to examine these questions from the perspective of contemporary thinkers in experimental aesthetics. Some thinkers of this school have criticized the general validity of the aesthetic judgment and the difference between the beautiful and the agreeable, and have tried to refute it experimentally. At the same time, Nick Zangwill, a well-known critic of the field of aesthetics in Kant's defense, considers the methods used in experimental aesthetics to be invalid and unreliable.

Research method: The research examines the two empirical approaches of Cova and Zangwill regarding Kant's aesthetics with a qualitative approach. In the first part, Kant's opinion is briefly introduced. The next section introduces some of the most important empirical studies by Cova that are presented in Kant's critique. An attempt is then made to categorize Zangwill's critiques so that they can be analyzed in the final section.

Conclusion: It seems that empirical research can be used to better understand Kant's aesthetics, and therefore, contrary to Zangwill, experimental aesthetics complements traditional aesthetics, not a failed attempt to discard them.

Keywords: *Kant, Aesthetic Judgment, Experimental Aesthetics, Zangwill, Cova.*

Problem Statement

The eighteenth century coincided with the confrontation of the two tendencies of rationalism and empiricism in the field of aesthetic issues. Empiricists, emphasizing the importance of the concept of taste in aesthetic judgment, stated that judgment about

beauty is immediate and without interest. Whereas in the rationalist view of aesthetic judgment, rational reasoning is possible by applying concepts (Zangwill, 2016, 64). The rationalist theory of the eighteenth century was the dominant one, believing that the beauty of an artwork must be proved by mathematical principles. Empiricists, on the other hand, insisted

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that beauty judgments were not made by inferring from rational principles or concepts; In other words, because it does not result from rational principles or concepts, it is a direct judgment without interest. Kant later defended this view in his *Critique of Judgment*. He enumerates the two basic and essential conditions of subjectivity and totality for taste judgment (Shelley, 2016, 35).

As is well known, Kant in his book the Critique of Judgment makes four general categories for aesthetic judgment. The Judgment of beauty is in terms of quality without interest; in terms of quantity has a general satisfaction; In terms of ratio is its basis purposiveness without purpose; In terms of direction is the judgment of taste universal and has the property of communicability. The necessity of judgment of taste is conditional and is subject to the presupposition of common sense (Dieter, 2003, 133). Kant believes that judgment of taste is reflective, not practical and that the enjoyment of beauty is not associated with personal interest. In other words, aesthetic judgments are subjective and have no basis except the feeling of pleasure and pain (Zia Shahabi, Arianpour, Hosseini & Jafari, 2017, 73). So aesthetic judgment does not refer to anything in the object. "in order to recognize that something is beautiful, we attribute the representation to the mind and its feeling of pleasure and pain, not with the help of understanding, but with the help of the imagination. Therefore, the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, but it is aesthetic and its basis is subjective" (Kant, 2004, 99). If the satisfaction we feel from an object leads to an interest in a way that its existence is important to us, it is not beautiful, but agreeable or good. Pleasure and good are both related to interest and desire. In contrast, the judgment of taste is merely observational and, with indifference to the existence of an object, measures its nature by a sense of pleasure and pain. (Schaffer, 2006, 69). In the second point of his book the Critique of Judgment, the judgment of taste in terms of quantity, Kant calls beautiful, something that creates general satisfaction without the presence of the concept. He believes that anyone without interest judges that the object is beautiful because the arbitrator

is completely free from desire and interest, therefore considers himself completely free and demands this judgment from everyone (Kant, 2004, 110). Kant's claims created a problem that still haunts philosophers and theorists of beauty over the years and has its pros and cons. The question is: 1- How can judgments of taste be both subjective and have universal validity? 2- How is it possible to make a distinctive difference between beautiful and agreeable? (Bowie, 2007, 33-40). The present article addresses these two issues in contemporary experimental aesthetic literature. First, in the second part, we will see that the universal validity of aesthetic judgments has been criticized in recent works of experimental aesthetics. The third section then deals with one of Zangwill's responses to this critique. The fourth part of the article is an attempt to judge between critics and proponents.

Empirical Research on the Nature of Aesthetic Judgment: A Critique of Kant

It was said that Kant believed that aesthetic judgment had intersubjective validity in the sense that aesthetic judgments were valid not only for the judge himself but for all human beings. But intersubjective validity is primarily for judgments that have an objective origin, and in the case of such judgments, one can be judged to be true or false. For example, when we say "water boils at 100" it has intersubjective validity because it can be objectively measured. Of course, not all objective judgments have intersubjective validity. For example, that "food is delicious" has no intersubjective validity, although it is said about something external, that is, a kind of food. Such judgments are based on personal experience and are subjective. But the question is, in the opposite direction, is what has intersubjective validity necessarily something external? We saw that Kant's answer is no. In his view, aesthetic judgment is both subjective and intersubjective. Florin Cova refutes Kant in an article entitled Beyond Intersubjective Validity: Recent Empirical Investigation into the Nature of Aesthetic Judgment. His refutation comes from a series of experimental studies, some of which he himself has done. He first shows that, contrary to Kant, the general

public does not consider aesthetic judgments to be intersubjective. It then answers the question, if the above judgment has no intersubjective validity, then how is it that people believe that there is good and bad aesthetic taste and that there can be expert and tasteful discussions about beautiful works? To answer this question, the author raises two separate issues: first, to what extent information about a beautiful object influences aesthetic judgment, and second, whether it is possible to make an aesthetic judgment not based on one's own experience, but on the experience of others (Cova, 2019, 10-12).

Cova and Pain's (2012) Studies

In three separate studies, Nicholas Pain and Florian Cova tried to show that Kant's basic assumption that when we make aesthetic judgments we expect others to confirm our judgments, that is, that aesthetic judgments have intersubjective validity, is a false presupposition. This study was conducted first among the French and then among people from different cultures and the results were similar. If Pain and Cova's empirical research is valid, it challenges not only Kant's most basic presupposition but also the common presupposition of many aesthetic philosophers. Therefore, it is appropriate to first make a brief reference to these experimental studies. In the first study, the participants (French students) were first asked to imagine two people who disagreed on some issues. The first was related to factual disagreement; disagreement about whether Proust is the author of *In Search of Lost Time*. The second case was a dispute over the interests of two people, for example, whether a certain food is delicious or not; And the third case expressed the disagreement of two people about the beauty of a work of art, such as the *Mona Lisa* painting. The participants had to choose one of the following four options in all three cases.

- (a) One of them is right while the other is wrong.
- (b) Both are right.
- (c) Both are wrong.
- (d) Neither is right or wrong. It makes no sense to speak in terms of correctness in this situation. Everyone is entitled to his own opinion.

According to Kant, most participants in the first case should choose the first option more than the other. (Or Proust is the author of *In Search of Lost Time* or not.) But Kant believes that two people can disagree on something subjective, such as the deliciousness of a particular food, and therefore should not choose the first option. So far, the work has confirmed the results of Kant's research. The interesting thing about aesthetic judgment was that the participants, contrary to Kant, who predicts that the first option would get the most votes, did not choose the first option. The participants in the artistic disagreement, as well as the disagreement about the deliciousness of the food, chose the fourth option more than the first option. In other words, research has shown that aesthetic judgment lacks intersubjective validity. Experimental aesthetic researchers presented themselves as critics and responded to some of the criticisms in advance. First, French students may have been tolerant, and therefore did not consider it necessary for others to accept taste judgments about a work of art. In response to this criticism, similar studies were conducted in different parts of the world, including Iran, and the previous results were repeated.

But another critique can still be made. Perhaps if one of the opponents is the individual himself, he will be less tolerant and believe that his taste judgment is correct, and others, if they have the right taste, will not question the validity of his sentence. Another experiment was performed to test this hypothesis. In the second study, people were asked to imagine two people, one of whom liked the sound of a nightingale and the other did not agree with him. As we saw in the previous experiment, in this case too, most of the candidates chose option 4, which shows that the candidates believed that there was no intersubjective validity for aesthetic judgment. Candidates were then asked to describe what they personally considered beautiful and then imagine someone who disagreed with their judgment. But the result of this experiment was similar to the previous ones (ibid, 15-18). Thus, even if the individuals themselves were one of the parties to the disagreement in assessing the validity of the aesthetic judgment, they

would still consider the vote to be subconscious. It may still be doubtful that, since most volunteers in aesthetic judgments did not choose Option 1, it can be quickly concluded that aesthetic judgments lack intersubjective validity. Other experiments were performed for this purpose, but the previous results were repeated. In the third study, the test was as follows: Participants were asked to consider the following three cases: Describe what a. Beautiful, b. Agreeable or c. Made of metal. Now imagine someone objecting to you, saying that this is not beautiful, not agreeable, or not made of metal. Then they were asked, which of the following options do you think best describes this situation?

- (a) One of you says something true while the other says something false.
- (b) Both of you say something true.
- (c) Both of you say something false.
- (d) Neither of you says something true or false.

And in another question, they were asked which of the following options best describes the two judgments?

- (a) One judgment is better than the other.
- (b) Both judgments are equally good.
- (c) Neither.

In parallel with previous research, the patterns of response to situations that spoke of being beautiful and agreeable were similar, but they were in stark contrast to the state that spoke of something objective, such as whether the fork was made of metal or not. So far there is empirical evidence against Kant.

Suppose we accept that aesthetic judgment has no intersubjective validity. But we still see that most people distinguish between good and bad tastes and participate in aesthetic discussions. The question now is, if people accept that aesthetic judgments are like subjective judgments about whether or not to like food, then why do people distinguish between different aesthetic judgments and consider one good and the other bad? Other research has been done in response to this question.

Study 4: Causal assumptions in folk aesthetic judgment
Perhaps aesthetic judgments are presented as a message to convey information. In this case, aesthetic judgment, like other messages, becomes context-

dependent and changes with changes in audience and context. In this case, people can judge differently based on the information they receive. Focusing on the communicative content behind aesthetic judgments can be the answer to why some judgments are better. To this end, Cova designed an experiment in which volunteers were divided into two groups: A control group and an experimental group. Members of the two groups were given different information on a topic but were asked to answer the same questions. The experiment was as follows:

Karen and Helena talk about the Eiffel Tower. Helena has been to Paris before and seen the Eiffel Tower. In her opinion, the Eiffel Tower is beautiful. The control group volunteers will be given only this information. But experimental group volunteers get more information. Helena did not tell Karen that she used drugs whenever she went to Paris and was under the influence of drugs. What Helena herself does not know is that the Eiffel would not have looked so beautiful if she had not used drugs while watching the Eiffel Tower. When participants in both groups were asked, "Is Helena's statement that 'Eiffel is beautiful' true or false?" The answers were significantly different. In the control group, less than 10% of the subjects said that Helena's words were false, while in the experimental group, almost half of the subjects said that Helena's words were false. Also, when asked about the "correctness" of Helena's artistic judgment, fewer people in the experimental group still believed that Helena had the right artistic judgment. (Explain that "correct artistic judgment" was defined for the subjects in such a way that right judgment if the object claimed to be beautiful, was the cause of the experience expressed in the sentence.)

The results showed that aesthetic judgments do not indicate the mental independence of the individual in the face of the object. Nor can it be claimed that they reflect one's inner experience. In fact, in the margins of any aesthetic judgment, there is information that influences judgment, and this information goes beyond one's experience with a beautiful object. The fact that some volunteers considered aesthetic judgment to be

something that conveys some information about the origin of one's experience makes it possible that aesthetic judgment may also be inaccurate; Because humans can make mistakes about the origin of their experiences. For this simple reason, we believe that some people have better aesthetic judgments (ibid, 23-26). Here's another question. When we say that aesthetic judgments convey information about aesthetic experience, does it mean that one can express the aesthetic experience of others in judgment instead of expressing one's own experience? Research has been done to answer this question. In response to this question, Cova cites the example of a mother who is feeding her baby. Although she personally does not like baby food, she tells her baby that the food is very tasty. In fact, in this case, the mother does not express her own experience, but the experience of the child. In these cases, the person does not talk about his personal experience, but about the possible experience of others (ibid, 27). Cova thinks the same thing applies to judgment of taste. He has done an interesting experiment to justify this opinion.

Study 5. The test is as follows:

Sarah is the mother of twin daughters, Anna and Claire. The grandmother of these two children sends a very large doll for their birthday. Sarah thinks the doll is very ugly, but she knows that Anna will like the doll and not Claire. Sarah puts the doll in the girls' bedroom. Anna returns from school earlier than Claire. "It's a beautiful thing in the bedroom," Sarah tells her.

Question 1: When Sarah tells Anna there is something beautiful in the bedroom, is she right or wrong?

- (a) She says something true.
- (b) She says something false, though she is convinced of saying something true.
- (c) She says something false, and she is aware of it.
- (d) What she says is neither true nor false.

Question 2: How much do you agree with this statement? "When Sarah tells her there is something beautiful in the bedroom, she is lying to her."

A few minutes later, Claire arrives and Sarah tells her, "You have to look in the bedroom. Something beautiful is waiting for you." Once again, questions are asked

about tests, this time about Claire. The results are interesting. The volunteers believed that their mother had lied to Claire but not to Anna. The results mean that Sarah's aesthetic claim could have been true or false, depending on who her audience was. In other words, the aesthetic judgment does not only reflect the individual's own subjective experience. When one makes aesthetic judgments, one usually does not talk about one's own aesthetic experience but may have used one's own aesthetic experience to express the experiences of others.

Therefore, the results of the mentioned studies can be summarized as follows. First, aesthetic judgments lack intersubjective validity. So far, contrary to Kant, they are like the judgment of the agreeable. But it can still be said that not all aesthetic judgments are on the same level. This is where we find that aesthetic judgments are used in two ways: either to convey information that a particular object creates in a person during an aesthetic experience; Or to express an experience that is likely to be created in the audience. Literary and film critics use this latter method to express their aesthetic experiences (Ibid, 2019, 30). Thus, experimental aesthetics opens new horizons for philosophers of art. But like any philosophical view, it has its opponents. To get acquainted with the opinion of one of the opponents, who is also a more familiar letter than the others, we have chosen Nick Zangwill and in the next section, we will introduce his critiques.

Beauty and the Agreeable: A Critique of Experimental Aesthetics

Nick Zangwill criticizes the methods and results of empirical aesthetics in his defense of Kant in an article entitled "The Beautiful and the Agreeable: A Critique of Experimental Aesthetics." Here we briefly introduce his most important critiques and in the next section, we will evaluate the critiques. Although Zangwill himself does not differentiate his critiques and presents them in a somewhat mixed way, for a closer look, we place his critiques in two general categories. In the first category, Zangwill accuses experimental aesthetics of having an incomplete reading of Kant's aesthetics, and as evidence of this claim, he deals with parts of Kant's aesthetics

that he believes have been overlooked by experimental aesthetics. The second category of critiques is related to the experiments themselves and identifies inefficiencies in the text of the experiments.

Critique of the first category: Kant's aesthetics is more than what can be seen in experiments

Zangwill argues that Kant seeks to answer the question of how the general consensus is expected from the pleasure of the beautiful, but not from the pleasure of the agreeable. What is the difference? Zangwill believes that one of the aspects of Kant's aesthetics that has been neglected in experimental philosophy is the relationship between pleasure and desire. Pleasure in the agreeable, but not pleasure in the beautiful, has an internal connection to desire. This is what Kant calls the "disinterestedness" of pleasure in the beauty and the "interestedness" of pleasure in agreeableness.

Kant also saw other differences between the two that can be seen in the normative demand. In the judgment of the beautiful, acknowledgment and agreement are sought from everyone, while in the judgment of the agreeable, there is no such demand. For contemporary aestheticians, the term normative is posed in the form of two questions: One. Does the judgment of the beautiful claim a special kind of correctness that the judgment of the agreeable lacks? Or two. There are certain judgments of beauty that one thinks one should (or should not) make; While there are no such do's and don'ts in judgment the agreeable? In other words, can one believe in the "standard of taste" like Hume? If there is a requirement and criterion for beauty, what is that criterion? Kant believed that only morality has the oughts that apply to all rational beings. These oughts cannot be applied to the field of aesthetics and are common only to those who share perceptual experiences or sensibility. The "universal voice" of the judgment of beauty binds only human beings—those who share our sensibility. Zangwill uses the example to explain that if there are other non-human beings in the universe, such as astronauts or angels, according to the laws of reason, they should have moral oughts in common with humans, but because they do not have our sensibilities, they will not have aesthetic judgments similar to humans. Kant

rightly distinguishes between ethics and aesthetics here. Ethics and aesthetics are distinct in the realm of normative demand, so aesthetics and ethics are not one and the same (Zangwill, 2019, 289). Another question is why should man have aesthetic oughts? Aesthetic issues and adherence to aesthetic norms are something that plays a significant role in everyday human life. Many people adhere to norms in their aesthetic judgments without actually being aware of them. There is even a norm about the agreeable, and it is far more powerful than previously thought. There are various exercises, and cultures for taste and training. If we look at this from Kant's point of view, we will say that the fact that Greek olive oil tastes best to most people and experts has public validity but not universal validity, that is, the need for universal agreement on the beautiful is more important than the agreeable. (While in the above experiments the distinction between public and universal validity is confused.). Eating too much food that we find delicious makes us feel disgusted. Of course, there is also a desire for diversity in beauty. The flowers in our house may look monotonous after a while, or Bach music may seem dull, but we will never feel disgusted with them. We may think of our previous judgment as a superficial or erroneous judgment, while there is a great deal of disgust with the agreeable. In short, the feeling of pleasure that comes from the beautiful is fundamentally different from the feeling of pleasure of agreeable and is of a different kind. In addition, the normative demands of the two are also different. Judgment of the beautiful has a character that the agreeable lacks and this character is the normative aspiration. This means that aesthetic judgments have a claim of correctness. The claim of correctness means that judgments about beauty and ugliness can be right or wrong. But what experimental aesthetics need to pay attention to is that not only is aesthetic judgment characteristic of accuracy, but also apathy, Zangwill believes. The aesthetic judgment also has two characteristics: correctness and disinterestedness. According to Zangwill, experimental aesthetics should pay attention to it (ibid, 291).

Criticisms of the second category: The methodology of the experiments has some drawbacks

In the continuation of the article, Zangwill examines the achievements and methods of experimental aesthetics in rejecting Kant's claim and analyzes the Cova and Pain method. Zangwill acknowledges that the answer to the question of whether or not there is a normative difference between the beautiful and the agreeable should be obtained through experimental philosophy (Xphi). But according to Zangwill, the experimental methods used so far have fundamental flaws and shortcomings. First Critique. Zangwill believes that Option 4 has its drawbacks in the first study (Neither is right or wrong. It makes no sense to speak in terms of the correctness in this situation. Everyone is entitled to his own opinion.). Including that the normality of aesthetic judgment is not well defined; The goal is not set correctly; Their description of the normative claims in question is not sufficient. Zangwill considers Option 4 to include three different ideas, all of which are offered to volunteers as one option, leaving them confused. These three ideas are: Neither is right or wrong; In this situation, the word correctness cannot be used; Everyone has his own opinion. Those who are involved in epistemology know that correctness is different from justification, but in these aesthetic studies their boundaries are blurred," states Zangwill. To illustrate this, Zangwill cites Ptolemy as saying that he had good mathematical justifications for the theory of the central earth, although we now know that this theory is incorrect. In these studies, there is confusion about the correctness of a judgment with the justification of a person for holding that judgment. This is clear when they propose to test laypeople. But what does it mean for an individual to be correct? Correctness holds for what people judge, not for their judging it. By contrast, justification holds of a person, not of what is judged. The second critique. The second problem is that when volunteers belong to different cultures, it does not provide a stronger justification for what they say because people in different cultures' perceptions of the concepts in the questions may differ. In the third critique, the use of imaginary examples clouds the

issue. Would the choice be the same in a real case? (Zangwill, 2019, 292-294). Fourth Critique. Another objection that Zangwill makes to this type of research is that proving whether people believe in certain norms through experimentation is complex and difficult. The norms that make up people's thinking are one thing, and following them is another. In explaining this, Zangwill gives the example of a thief who if asked, "Is thievery a good thing?" He will say no, it is morally wrong. Fifth critique. Another is that the nature of one type of thinking or the difference between two types of thinking is not easily expressed in words. Language may obscure or at least not reflect thought. That is, the difference between the two concepts is not easily expressed in language (ibid., 297).

Critique Six. The hallmark of the experimental philosophy is the use of questionnaires. Zangwill has more general critiques of the whole experimental philosophy and also criticizes its use of the questionnaire. It is often assumed that there are concepts in the questionnaire that are known and accepted. Zangwill basically begs the question: Why should we set so much store by what people say they do in questionnaires? They may want to please those doing the asking. They may simply not know the answers and may make something up. Zangwill does not believe that the questionnaires reflect the true beliefs of the people. In his critique of the Kova-Paine questionnaire method, he points to issues that have been neglected. First, the questionnaire should cover all aspects of a subject. Not enough care is taken in selecting the questionnaire options. The options provided in the questionnaires may impose a particular attitude. There may be convergence between the questionnaire options, in which case the result will not be accurate. A good questionnaire needs to be screened for external causes. Seventh Critique. Another case that Zangwill refers to as a flaw in the questionnaire method refers to the people who fill out the questionnaires. He refers to this as a lack of self-knowledge. He examines the lack of self-knowledge in three different ways. The first is the lack of knowledge of normative guidance in our thought. The second is the difference between the mental acceptance of

normative guidance and its practical adherence to it, and the third is the complexity of expressing the nature of thought through words. Self-knowledge, in its original sense, means doing the daily activities of life, such as walking, reading, cycling, and the like. A person may ride a bicycle well or spend a lot of time walking daily, but if asked in a questionnaire what walking means or what is the difference between good and bad walking, he may not be able to give a definitive answer because many people do not. They do not know what they think about the things they normally do. Now, if they are asked about moral and artistic standards and concepts, they will certainly not be able to explain them. Experts and art experts should be expected to have an opinion and principles on art issues, but this is not exactly what can be expected from ordinary people. Ordinary people may know the conceptual aspect of beauty but do not know the exact explanation of this conceptual aspect. Aesthetic judgments are issues of conceptual normativeness, and one may reach such a judgment through conceptual reflection and analysis, but its profound nature is not revealed to the individual even through conceptual practice and reflection. Regardless of the profound nature that remains undiscovered, the conceptual aspect of human thought may be understood in implicit ways. For example, the desire for normativeness may have implicitly made the presuppositions of his aesthetic thinking without the person having reliable knowledge of it. People might even have absurd meta-beliefs. Absurd meta-beliefs would not interfere with bicycle riding, but it has profound implications for his conceptual judgments. It is common for people to be in denial about the norms they are following. But many of the norms that are consciously denied have an active presence in the subconscious. Norms may govern mental and physical behavior even though people are unaware of it, and they may even deny it. Consider the example of pain in Zangwill's article; People know pain, but is their belief in pain reliable when it comes to philosophical questionnaires? Does having pain mean philosophical knowledge of pain? Why should one trust the amateur speculations of those who think in a certain way about

what they are doing? Perhaps people do have a kind of knowledge by experiencing pain or by engaging in a conceptual practice but they are not philosophers. A study was conducted in which the issue of raw attitudes among new students was examined. Students taking introductory ethics courses were given a questionnaire in the first semester in which they expressed their views on ethics. Some nonreligious students confidently assert in the first week of the course that there is no right or wrong in moral judgment.

But at the end of the semester, they clung to strong moral views because they gradually realized that believing that there is no right or wrong in morality equates to losing the power of judgment. The students initially argued that there was no moral meta-view, but from the beginning, tolerance was considered good and intolerance was considered bad.

Critical Analysis of Experimental Aesthetics

Zangwill's critiques, like Cova and Pain's experiments, not only contribute to our better understanding of Kant's aesthetics but also introduce new horizons to aesthetic philosophers who were previously unknown to experimental aesthetics. With the new critiques and experiments that are proposed in response to these critiques, we will see a further expansion of aesthetics. In this section, an attempt will be made to provide answers from experimental philosophers to Zangwill's critiques.

• Analysis of the first category of Zangwill's critiques

Zangwill's statement is acceptable that only a part of Kant's aesthetics has been studied in the mentioned experimental research. Therefore, the critique that these studies impose on the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic verdict should not be attributed to Kant's entire aesthetics. But it is necessary to pay attention to two points. First, Cova and Pain did not. Incidentally, they have made it very clear that their only intention is to examine Kant's view. But this should not cause the bell to be ignored. This is where we come to the second point. Zangwill argues that a part of Kant's aesthetic system cannot be tested in isolation because

Kant's view is conceptually linked to his view of the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience. Zangwill, therefore, argues that such research modeling is part of Kant's theory and cannot critique Kant's theory in any way. This statement is somewhat acceptable. But there is also criticism of it in another area of aesthetic research (Chatterjee, 2014, 53-70). In a field called neuro-aesthetics, studies have been done on the concept of disinterested pleasure in aesthetics. Interestingly, this research supports this part of Kant's theory. Findings show that pleasure and desire-related hormones are released through different pathways. We usually enjoy what we want and we want something to enjoy. But the two are not necessarily always together. People with high levels of addiction tend to be addicted to drugs without enjoying them. The opposite point has been observed in aesthetic experiments. In the aesthetic experience, desire-related hormones are not activated and therefore no body desire is created. But pleasure-related hormones are released. This means that there is empirical evidence to support Kant that true aesthetic experience is associated with disinterested pleasure. Zangwill does not mention such research. But if he was referring to this research, he could have made a better suggestion: That a series of different experimental studies should be put together to get a better picture of Kant's aesthetics. But is such a thing necessary? Can biology help to better understand Kant's aesthetics? Hannah Ginsburg, a commentator named Kant in the field of aesthetics, answers this question in the affirmative (Ginsburg, 2019, 132-140). Kant makes his most important remarks on aesthetics in his critique of judgment; A book consisting of two parts, the first part on aesthetics and the second part on teleology in biology. This book is one of the works of Kant's maturity. Until about the 1990s, it was a mysterious question among Kant scholars as to how to relate these two separate sections of the book and why Kant did not publish these two sections in two separate books (Körner, 2001, 123-125). But it was then that some Kantian scholars began to think that there might be a close connection between the two. So it is possible that Kant himself if he were alive today, would not be

opposed to conducting biological research in the field of aesthetics.

• Analysis of the second category of Zangwill's critiques

Zangwill's second critiques, despite their multiplicity, are not as strong as his first critiques. Some of them are due to misunderstandings of the scientific method or objections without providing strong reasons, and of course, others are thoughtful critiques. Here are some of them. Zangwill's first critique is that the questionnaire options should have higher philosophical accuracy, and it points well to the distinction between justification and correctness.

Zangwill's second critique was that people in different cultures had different understandings of the concepts in the questionnaires, and so the results of intercultural research showed that people around the world gave almost the same amount of intersubjective credit to aesthetic judgments were invalid. There are many criticisms of this statement. First, Zangwill's argument invalidates all research in branches of science such as psychology and intercultural anthropology. Zangwill may like the same view of all intercultural research. But there is also a logical objection to Zangwill's statement. If the results of intercultural research in measuring the intersubjective validity of taste judgments showed that there are intercultural differences and some in a culture believe in something and some in another culture do not, one of the reasons could be intercultural differences in understanding the concepts of the questionnaires. It is a miracle that people from different cultures have different understandings of the meanings of the questionnaires but still chooses the same options. The third to fifth critiques of Zangwill is worth considering. Zangwill may be right, and using more realistic examples in the context of aesthetic judgments in everyday life will yield other results. It's a good idea to do other fieldwork in everyday life. However, when such studies do not have conflicting results with the research done, the results of these researches can be considered valid. These criticisms are positive because they motivate researchers of experimental philosophy to conduct research in which they pay attention to

the context of everyday life and avoid abstract and artificial states. The sixth and seventh critiques point out the shortcomings of using the questionnaire. These criticisms are also positive because they are an invitation to conduct alternative research. But they also have the disadvantage that in many cases there is no alternative for psychologists and social scientists. The fact that the use of questionnaires is associated with problems has not caused questionnaires to lose their important role in the behavioral and social sciences. In conclusion, the least benefit of any research on experimental aesthetics is that even if we disagree with the results and the way it works, it has led traditional aesthetics to re-read philosophers like Kant in response to criticism.

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